Rex Wilkinson and Coventry Cove v. Morgan County Board of Appeals, Michael McMillan and Ann McMillan: Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Rex Wilkinson and Coventry Cove v. Morgan
County Board of Appeals, Michael McMillan and
Ann McMillan: Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
M. Darrin Hammond; Smith and Knowles; attorneys for appellants.
Benson Hathaway, Stephen W. Geary; Kirton and McConkie; attorneys for appellees.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Wilkinson v. Morgan County Board, No. 20060895 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6844
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Rex Wilkinson and Coventry 
Cove, LLC, 
Appellants 
v. 
Morgan County Board of Appeals, 
Michael McMillan and Ann McMillan, 
Appellees 
Appellate Case No.: 20060895 
District Court Civil: 050500103AA 
Oral Argument Requested 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
REX WILKINSON AND COVENTRY COVE, LLC 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR MORGAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Kirton & McConkie 
Benson Hathaway 
60 E. South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Smith Knowles, P.C. 
M. Darin Hammond 
4723 Harrison, Suite 200 | 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
A ttorneys for Appellants 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE coui-
APR23 2007 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
Rex Wilkinson and Coventry 
Cove, LLC, 
Appellants 
v. 
Morgan County Board of Appeals, 
Michael McMillan and Ann McMillan, 
Appellees 
Appellate Case No.: 20060895 
District Court Civil: 050500103AA 
Oral Argument Requested 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
REX WILKINSON AND COVENTRY COVE, LLC 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR MORGAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
Kirton & McConkie 
Benson Hathaway 
60 E. South Temple, #1800 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Smith Knowles, P.C. 
M. Darin Hammond 
4723 Harrison, Suite 200 
Ogden,Utah 84403 
A ttorneys for Appellants 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT 3 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT UPHOLD THE MORGAN COUNTY 
BOARD OF APPEALS' DECISION AS A CORRECT APPLICATION OF 
UTAH CODE § 17-27a-704 (2005) 3 
A. THE MORGAN COUNTY BOARD OF APPEALS' DECISION IS 
TO BE REVIEWED BY THIS COURT FOR CORRECTNESS 
3 
B. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE § 17-27a-704 
ALLOWS FOR A TEN DAY APPEAL PERIOD IN THESE 
CIRCUMSTANCES 5 
CONCLUSION 7 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. §17-27a-704 (2005) 
Cases 
Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208 (2004) 
State v. Martinez. 52 P.3d 1276 (2002) 
Other Authorities 
None 
Rules 
None 
Treatises 
None 
Constitutional Provisions 
None 
ii 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD NOT UPHOLD THE MORGAN COUNTY BOARD 
OF APPEALS' DECISION AS A CORRECT APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE 
§17-27a-704 (2005). 
At the time of the Morgan County Council's land use decision pertaining to 
Coventry Cove, LLC, which was May 17, 2005, Utah Code Ann. §17-27a-704 (2005) 
was in effect. Moreover, Morgan County did not have any ordinance pertaining to the 
time period for appealing a land use decision at that time. 
Based upon the foregoing, the statutory time period in which to appeal the May 
17, 2005, decision of the County Council was ten calendar days therefrom, expiring on 
May 27, 2005. See Utah Code Ann. §17-27a-704. Rather than filing their appeal before 
the deadline, Michael and Ann McMillan, by and through their counsel, sent a letter to 
Morgan County purporting to appeal the May 17, 2005 land use decision, which was 
hand delivered on June 16, 2005, to Morgan County. R. 388, f5. The Morgan County 
Board of Appeals ignored the law of the state of Utah and entertained the appeal filed by 
the McMillans. 
This court should find that the McMillans5 appeal was not filed in a timely manner 
and should not uphold the Morgan County Board of Appeals' decision as a correct 
application of Utah Code §17-27a-704 (2005). 
A. THE MORGAN COUNTY BOARD OF APPEALS5 DECISION IS TO BE 
REVIEWED BY THIS COURT FOR CORRECTNESS. 
The Appellees have gone to great lengths to stress that the standard of review is 
"not a pure 'correctness' review, but rather accords the agency's decision with 'some 
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level of non-binding deference.5" Under this standard the Appellees conclude that 
Wilkinson "must establish not only that his is the correct interpretation of [the] statute, 
but that it is the only defensible definition that the Morgan County Board of Appeals 
could apply." This conclusion does not flow logically from the standard of review nor 
does it adequately represent the standard as presented by the very case on which the 
Appellees rely. See, Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 104 P.3d 1208 (2004). 
In Carier the Utah Supreme Court set forth the standard of review by stating, 
"[w]e believe a better approach is that adopted by those jurisdictions that review a local 
agency's interpretation of ordinances for correctness, but also afford some level of non-
binding deference to the interpretation advanced by the local agency." Id. at % 28. In 
reaching this conclusion the Court provided the following rationale, "[t]his intermediate 
approach provides a proper balance by affording respect to the local agency's specialized 
knowledge while ensuring that the interpretation of ordinances and statutes remains 
firmly within the province of the courts." Id-
From the Carrier Court's rationale it is clear that the Court was not removing the 
interpretation of state and statutes from the province of courts, merely it was affording 
respect to local agency's specialized knowledge in the limited areas they govern. Thus, it 
is not logical to conclude that Wilkinson must establish that his interpretation of the 
statute is the only defensible interpretation. Rather this Court must determine whether 
the Morgan County Board of Appeals' interpretation of the applicable state statute is 
correct. In doing so this Court should not find that the Morgan County Board of Appeals 
has some specialized knowledge with regard to the interpretation of Utah Code Ann. §17-
4 
27a-704 (2005). Therefore, this Court should not afford the Morgan County Board of 
Appeals' interpretation with any deference. 
Even if this Court should choose to apply the "non-binding deference" add-on to 
the correctness standard such deference is not appropriate in this cause because it 
involves interpretation of a state statute, not a local issue or a county ordinance. This 
Court should not defer to a county quasi-judicial body when interpreting a state law. 
Even if such deference were applied it is nonbinding anyway. Therefore, this case is not 
appropriate for modification of the standard of review. This Court's only inquiry is 
whether the board's decision illegally violated the Utah State statutes. See, Carrier f 26. 
Based upon the above, this Court should ignore Appellees' attempts to modify the 
legal standard of review. This Court should determine the correctness of the Morgan 
County Board of Appeals' interpretation of Utah Code Annotated § 17-27a-704 (2005). 
B. THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF UTAH CODE §17-27a-704 ALLOWS FOR 
A TEN DAY APPEAL PERIOD IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
Utah Code Ann. §17-27a-704 (2005) states: 
(l)The county shall enact an ordinance establishing a reasonable time to 
appeal a decision of a land use authority to an appeal authority. 
(2) In the absence of such an ordinance and at a minimum, an adversely 
affected party shall have ten calendar days to appeal. 
When interpreting statutes, the primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the 
legislature. State v. Martinez, 52 P.3d 1276 (2002). The first step of statutory 
interpretation is to evaluate the "best evidence" of legislative intent, namely, "the plain 
language of the statute itself." Id "When examining the statutory language we assume 
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the legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning." 
Id. 
In this case the plain language of the statute is that: "In the absence of such an 
ordinance and at a minimum, an adversely affected party shall have ten calendar days to 
appeal." It is undisputed that the County did not at the time have an ordinance setting 
forth any time period for appealing land use decisions. R. at 388, at ^|5, R 389 at % 10. 
All references to an ordinance establishing a thirty day appeal period are to an ordinance 
that was enacted after the McMillan appeal had been filed on June 16, 2005. R. 388 at 
Tf5. Despite this fact the Morgan County Board of Appeals read the applicable statute to 
mean "at least" instead of "at a minimum." R. 14 at f42. 
Substituting its own verbiage for the verbiage of the Utah legislature provides a 
different meaning to the statute. The phrase "at a minimum" refers to the prior section of 
the applicable statute, and means that a county, if it decides to set forth a time period for 
hearing appeals of land use decisions, must set a period that is no less than ten days. 
However, in the absence of any ordinance setting forth an appeal time, the appeal time is 
ten days. The Morgan County Board of Appeals ignored the above-referenced law and 
rendered an opinion which was clearly result-oriented. R. 7-20. 
A significant problem with the Morgan County Board of Appeals' interpretation 
of the statute is that, under this interpretation, an appeal period should be at least 10 day— 
which basically renders the deadline for filing an appeal to be indeterminate. This would 
mean that the legislature intended to have no appellate deadline. Such an interpretation is 
nonsensical and renders the statute without meaning. The only interpretation of the 
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language at issue which truly gives any meaning to the legislative intent is to conclude 
that the legislature intended for ten days to be the appeal deadline when no other deadline 
was established by county ordinance. The interpretation espoused by Appellees requires 
additional wording to be inserted or additional assumptions made not expressly set forth 
by the legislature. Thus, the Morgan County Board of Appeals should have interpreted 
the statute to preclude the McMillan's appeal as untimely. 
Rex Wilkinson and Coventry Cove, LLC respectfully request that this court apply 
Utah Code Ann. §17-27a-704, according to the plain language of the statute and not 
substitute any other wording for the language "at a minimum" like the Morgan County 
Board of Appeals did and which the Second District Court followed. Based on such, Rex 
Wilkinson and Coventry Cove, LLC respectfully request that this Court reverse the ruling 
below and require the Morgan County Board of Appeals to vacate its decision because it 
was based upon an untimely and therefore illegal appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, Appellants request that the Court of Appeals find 
that the Morgan County Board of Appeals erred in interpreting Utah Code Ann. §17-27a-
704 to allow for the subject appeal to be filed within 30 days. This Court should find that 
Utah Code Ann. §17-27a-704 only allowed for a ten day period for filing the subject 
appeal and that because it was not filed prior to May 27, 2005, that it was untimely. 
Therefore, this Court should require that the Board of Appeals' decision to disallow the 
subdivision must be reversed. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this <2J? day of April, 2007. 
M. Darin Hammond 
Attorneys for Appellants Rex Wilkinson and Coventry 
Cove, LLC 
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